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Abstract
In this essay I examine the conceptual difficulties generated
by drawing a distinction between artworks and mere real
things. I argue that the distinction is an unfortunate one,
requiring for its operation an assumption of possibility of an
objective value judgment with regard to aesthetic productions,
which, in reality cannot be defensible on purely philosophical
grounds. The distinction, in fact, may be useful in describing
the interactions between the artworld, qua a cultural
institution, and the socio-economic environment in which it is
situated; yet, it proves misleading when introduced into
discussions about the nature of artworks and the nature of our
interactions with art. I also recommend, in passing, that our
understanding of art may benefit from embracing a more
holistic approach to construing the relationship between
artworks and human agents within a culturally constituted
space of the artworld - an approach, perhaps, along the lines
resembling those suggested by Margolis' historicized
relativism.
Key Words
artwork, commodity, contextualism, empiricism,
intersubjective value, objective value, reductionism,
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1. Challenges to Common Sense: "Contextualism"
Versus Culturally Enriched Consciousness
Starting in the 1960s, an entire cohort of aspiring theorists of
art set out to reinvent aesthetics by providing a constructive
critique of the then-dominant academic trend that was later
aptly dubbed by Gregory Currie "aesthetic empiricism."[1]
They were largely successful in this enterprise, and today their
names appear as a part of the established canon of
contemporary philosophy of art: Danto, Wollheim, Levenson,
to mention just a few. What motivates this paper is an attempt
to offer a retrospective interpretation of the significance of
their success, as well as its implications for the way we
approach and discuss artworks today. More specifically, I am
interested in addressing in some detail the distinction between
artworks and "mere real things," originally introduced by Danto
in his landmark paper "The Artworld"[2] a distinction that was
destined to play a pivotal role in the development of the new
"contextualist," as David Davies calls them, theories of art[3].
The reason for my curiosity on this score is supplied by the
fact that yet another prominent aesthetician, Joseph Margolis,
has been insisting for quite some time that the renowned
distinction may not be a happy one.[4] For my own part, I find
the distinction philosophically suspect, because it appears to
presuppose a possibility of making a value judgment mediated
by some sort of objective criteria, such as those derived from
art theory, without supplying any reason to think that such a
judgment could possibly be made on purely philosophical

grounds without invoking some kind of discursive privilege.
The empiricist attitude, which Danto and those of similar
conviction intended to confront, possesses a good deal of
intuitive appeal. In fact, as Davies points out in his recent
book, it more or less coincides with a common-sense view of
the arts.[5] In a nutshell, the empiricist maintains that
experiencing an artwork is tantamount to being affected by its
manifest and objectively verifiable properties. Thus,
considerations pertaining to the historical and cultural contexts
in which the work was produced, as well as the intentions of
the work's author, may be of interest in and of themselves;
however, they have no essential bearing on the reception and
evaluation of an artwork qua aesthetic product. The
advantages of such a view are obvious. First of all, it enables
us to treat artworks in the same way that we treat ordinary
physical objects or events; just like the warmth we feel when
standing near a hot stove can be directly attributed to the
properties of the heated metal, the aesthetic pleasure we
experience in encountering an artwork can be unambiguously
traced to certain properties of an artwork analyzed qua a
physical object. This sense of objectivity, in turn, gives us a
certain hope of solving some age-old puzzles related to art,
such as questions pertaining to the standard of taste or the
doubts about the precise nature of aesthetic attraction. The
formalist-inspired determination to restrict one's attention to
the surface properties of an artwork, then, holds a great
promise, a promise of possibility of a science of aesthetics;
hardly a negligible gain in an age obsessed with its own
epistemological prowess.
On the practical side of things, the empirical attitude in
aesthetics draws attention to the artwork itself, qua an
accomplished product, making it the focus of aesthetic
sensibility. Artwork itself is understood primarily as a wellcrafted thing. The artist, then, is recognized as a master
craftsman, on par with an engineer who succeeds in designing
a functioning engine. The measure of the craftsman's
achievement in both cases is the same and is entirely
objective: namely, the practical yield of the desired effect. In
this way, the empirical attitude advocates an objective, rather
than subjective, standard of value: an artwork is good insofar
as it works. The virtues of this particular stance can be best
expressed in an idiom of somebody like Benjamin, who
stubbornly maintains that our nostalgia for the holy ghost of
an artwork, the longing for auratic properties that transcend
the immediate functionality of an object, is best seen as a
carry-over of idle bourgeois mentality conditioned to concoct a
mythical speculative value where no empirical value can speak
for itself.[6]
An empiricist approach to art, of course, has a few notable
shortcomings. For instance, it places very strict and narrowminded constraints on interpretation as a component in the
appreciation of artworks, practically reducing the hermeneutic
aspect of the audience's involvement with the artwork to a nil.
Thus, if the Romantic age of theory was obsessed with
psychology of the artist, the empiricist approach appears to
have an opposite predilection for the psychology of the viewer,
with the viewer understood as a generic a temporal subject
with a properly functioning perceptual apparatus. What the

empiricist view, then, actively precludes is the understanding
of art as a kind of dialogue between the artist and the
appreciative public, a dialogue conditioned by specific historical
and cultural circumstances. The work of art is thereby placed
in an ideal space outside of time and severs its conventional
bond with its origin in a particular configuration of prevailing
human interests and goals. In this way, it comes to stand on
par with a natural object, i.e., a mere physical thing. The
empiricist strategy, then, effectively amounts to deriving a
procedure for establishing an I scale for artworks at the price
of excluding all possible considerations of their intersubjective
value.
From an art-historical perspective, the empiricist stance is
guilty of ignoring properties that an artwork may acquire by
virtue of its placement in a particular context; i.e., it
underplays the semantic properties of the work in favor of
physical ones. An empiricist, therefore, fails to account for the
fact that aside from generating perceptual experiences an
artwork also, and perhaps, primarily, generates a certain
meaning, conveys a certain message, the actual content of
which depends on and is necessarily mediated by the cultural
historical circumstances of the work's emergence and
presentation. In fact, as theorists of Danto's ilk would be likely
to point out, the empiricist stance must be flawed even in its
treatment of the spectator's relation to the artwork's surfaceproperties, since the selection of the surface properties which
a given spectator is likely to find worthy of attention may itself
depend on cultural knowledge that does not patently display
itself as one of the perceived aspects of a work qua physical
object. A painting by Rothko, for example, may look very
different when surrounded by works of Titian and Rubens,
instead of hanging alongside the paintings by Newman and de
Kooning. Goya's work from the Disasters of War series may
lose quite a bit of its despairing eloquence unless one can
contrast its style with that of his earlier paintings depicting the
august persons of the Spanish royal family.
While conceding the validity of these concerns, I intend to
argue that Danto's radically counter-empiricist contextualist
strategy developed on the basis of observations such as these
itself yields a solution that cannot fail to be perceived as
somewhat artificial, while leaving intact the rather
questionable assumption that founds the empiricist theory:
namely, that it is, in fact, possible to devise a reductive
criterion for determining objective value of artworks. Of
course, in Danto's case, the only objective difference in value
that remains standing is the one between artworks and mere
real things, making, therefore, for a somewhat more modest
proposal with regard to the prospects of objective evaluation.
But first I would like to adumbrate a possibility of an
alternative approach to the treatment of artworks, one that
parts ways both with the perceptualism of the empiricist and
the contextualism of Danto, a possibility which could give us a
sense of measure in assessing Danto's philosophical strategy.
The possibility I have in mind is largely inspired by the work of
Joseph Margolis and focuses on the prospects of thinking about
art in semiotic terms, describing our interactions with artworks
in the context of a functioning living space, a semiosphere.
Such an approach would have the particular merit of enabling

us to recognize the identity of artworks qua things, without
thereby obscuring the contribution of their signifying,
meaning-generating properties. From the perspective of a
semiotized living environment, an artwork appears as more
than a merely passive thing: as an active participant in a
certain kind of exchange, a certain type of social discourse; as
a thing that is capable of posing questions, challenging norms,
deceiving, opposing other artworks, and providing a sarcastic
commentary. Things here behave like they would in the semimagical world of Borges, like legendary weapons of murder
endowed with inscrutable wills of their own, forever finding
new contexts and new sets of duelists to test their mettle
against each other. To act in this manner, artworks (things
that they are) would have to enter into a symbiotic
relationship with the cultural agents who wield them and fuse
their own human destinies with the destinies of the things they
value and trust, as the usually silent nature enters into a
symbiotic relationship with a scientist in the context of a
laboratory, giving rise to the cultural discourse of
Naturwissenschaft. Danto's mechanistic contextualism patently
falls short of yielding a possibility of such symbiotic
relationship.
What is called for here is an intuitively simple recognition of
the artworld qua a particular Lebensform, a particular
ecological system productive of its own specific forms of
relationships reflected in the discourse of the arts which it
generates. It is a less Platonic and a more Aristotelian vision.
It is in this "ecological" spirit, I believe, that Margolis proposes
to treat artworks as culturally emergent persons, ontologically
similar to those culturally emergent human persons of
educated sensibility who participate in the creation of artworks
and arrange the settings for the course of the artworks'
historical career.[7] Importantly, by entering into a such a
system of symbiotic relationships constitutive of the artworld,
the artwork's physicality does not become erased; no more so,
at any rate, then does the physicality of a human agent who is
transformed by a culture's educative practices into an agent of
the artworld: i.e., a person who looks a certain way, talks in a
certain way, has certain peculiar interests and sensibilities, all
the while remaining an ordinary biological organism. Thus it
isn't altogether clear why, if recognizing someone as a person
doesn't necessarily depend on explicitly imputing to them
some set of unperceivable properties, we should feel obliged to
demand, as Danto does, that recognizing something as an
artwork should depend on the imputation of a certain
theoretical significance or intent. The notion of a symbiotic
relationship advocated here would seem, instead, to imply a
kind of informal familiarity that enables one to forgo explicit
theoretical justification of one's judgments.
It is true, on the other hand, that traditionally reductive
rationalistic analysis tends to strongly resist introduction of
any such informality. On the premises of a reductive
rationalistic discourse, a rational agent, to begin with, is best
represented by the sum-total of his or her statements,
especially those statements that appear to give rise to a
logically coherent whole. It would, then, only make sense to
represent artworks accordingly: as a sum-total of coherent
statements made about them; statements that would
hopefully add up to an orderly theoretical picture.

This is the approach explicitly favored by Danto, who, in fact,
opposes the extremes of reductive empiricism with a version
of radical reductive rationalism. In this sense, the drift of his
argument asymptotically approaches the somewhat extreme
vision defended by Baxandall[8] who claims that our
relationship to artworks is always mediated by a verbal
description. In replying to Margolis' criticism, for instance,
Danto plainly insists that his primary interest is "in the
analysis of cultural language . . . in truth conditions"[9]; and
the analysis of truth conditions, of course, usually implies a
concern with statements and descriptions, rather than, say,
sensations and things. Despite its counter-intuitiveness, such
an approach can boast of at least one major gain: namely, it
enables us to preserve a sense of objectivity with respect to
judgments about art, while letting go of the empiricist dogma.
In other words, it succeeds in replacing "naturalistic"
objectivity of the empiricist with the objectivity of an
analytically structured theoretical discourse.
2. Artwork and "Mere Real Things"
Danto's argument for excluding the physical perceivable
properties from the definition of artworks relies chiefly on a
simple observation that two perceptually identical things may
turn out to be different artworks; in fact, one of them may not
be an artwork at all but a mere real thing.[10] Thus, in "The
Artworld" paper, Danto asks us to imagine two identical
paintings: two white rectangular canvases each traversed by a
single black line in the middle. One of the canvases is titled
"Newton's First Law," and the second "Newton's Third Law."
While the two paintings are perceptually identical, the way in
which we view and interpret them, according to Danto,
changes depending on the title. In one case, we're supposed
to see two white masses colliding along a straight line; in the
other, a lonely particle traveling in a straight endless line
through a white emptiness. Thus, while the perceptual
properties of the two paintings coincide, the paintings are
different; and their differences emerge only once we take into
account the knowledge of art theory and the atmosphere of
the artworld.
Along similar lines, one could argue that a urinal found by
Duchamp was perceptually indistinguishable (aside from the
signature) from the urinal that he later presented to the
artworld public, yet one was just a common discarded urinal,
while the other was (and is) The Fountain, a venerable work of
contemporary art, subject to maintenance and historic
preservation. On the basis of cases such as these, Danto
famously concludes that being a work of art - and being this or
that particular work of art - does not depend on the way in
which the artwork spontaneously enters our perceptual field
but instead on the way its description is positioned within the
space of reasons pertaining to the history and theory of art.
Ultimately, then, an artwork acquires its identity qua artwork
in virtue of something that an "eye cannot descry."[11]
To draw on Danto's idiom, when we say what an artwork is, we
are using the "is" of artistic identification, the use of which is
governed by rules having little or nothing to do with the
properties of an artwork qua a physical object; dealing instead
with the properties of the theoretical locus corresponding to

this physical object in the discourse of the arts. An artwork,
then, is different from a "mere real thing,"[12] because the
latter exists in a physical space or in the space of pragmatic
reasons, whereas the former has its true existence only in the
space of reasons and statements concerned with the theory
and history of the arts.
Danto's theory then, if I understand it correctly, asks us to
envision a rather odd scenario, in which a thing's meaning is
radically separated from its identity qua a physical thing and
requires that we accept this scenario as always obtaining in
the case of artworks. Accepting Danto's proposal on this score
must also entail endorsing some questionable possibilities with
regard to identifying artworks; thus, there seems to be no
reason why an artwork could not be created by gratuitously
imputing theoretical significance to any old thing that happens
our way or, conversely, why someone should have as much as
an inkling of recognition when confronted with a traditional
masterpiece belonging to one of the conventional genres.
These possibilities, of course, while entirely legitimate on
Danto's terms, appear to not only contradict the dictates of
the abominable common sense, but also disagree with much of
what has been said about art throughout history by theorists
and chroniclers as well as by artists themselves.
Margolis, in fact, is inclined to pursue the issue further and
claims that, since the artwork emerges, on Danto's account,
only as a result of rhetorically imputing certain indiscernible
properties to a physical object, it must necessarily follow that
nothing really exists as an artwork![13] Considerations of
indiscernibility that Danto cites in support of his position have,
at best, only a tangential bearing on this argument since, as
Margolis points out, the answer to the question of what it is to
be a certain kind of thing doesn't, generally, depend on first
answering the question about the circumstances in which a
thing of a particular kind may be indistinguishable from some
other kind of thing.[14] Some works of art may be
indistinguishable, under certain circumstances, from things
that are not works of art or from forgeries; however, these
special occasions are best understood as interesting exceptions
to the rules rather than the bone fide cornerstones for erecting
a new set of rules. One cannot base a theory describing an
entire set of entities on considerations pertaining exclusively to
the marginal members of this set. A voice saying "Thank you"
on an answering-machine recording may belong to a real
person expressing gratitude or to a parrot expressing nothing
at all; yet the possibility of the latter scenario doesn't
constitute a good reason for thinking that the way we
understand the meaning of a "Thank you" has nothing to do
with the physical properties of the sound.
In fact, Margolis does find the analogy with language
particularly revealing in this regard: We do not hear a mere
sequence of sounds to which we then impute a particular
meaning; we hear meaningful speech or utterance in which the
physical form is fused with the intentional content. The
distinction between expression-form and expression-content
can be made a posteriori, and may prove to be a fruitful one;
however, insofar as this distinction is itself a product of
analytic abstraction, it would be wrong to describe the process
of understanding itself in terms of a synthesis between the

perceived form and the rhetorically imputed content. Which is
not to say that such synthesis is not implied in the process of
articulation that leads to the production of an utterance.
Thus, sometimes, we pay special attention to the way in which
meaning elaborates itself in overt speech; to the way in which
an artwork emerges from its medium. Theorists like David
Davis, moreover, believe that attention to this dialectic of
meaning and form constitutes the true focus of aesthetic
appreciation, which dwells in each case on the creative
performance of the artist, on the workmanship that displays
itself in the product.[15] Yet, nothing of the sort can be
feasible on Danto's account, whereby the audience is
presented on the one hand with a physical object and on the
other with a theoretical description of its role in the public life
of art. The body of an artwork, with such a view, serves
merely as a token in a game of art, a token which, in itself, is
not likely to possess any special value or be an object of
interest and scrutiny.
Perception, says Danto, is like digestion: It remains constant
and unchangeable regardless of the cultural experiences to
which an individual is subjected and, consequently, regardless
of the meaningful impressions that it may end up
delivering.[16] There must be, then, no such thing as
perceptual education and culture, no such thing as a
connoisseur's eye trained to closely follow the performance.
Everybody sees everything that's there to be seen; a person
versed in art theory merely knows why some of the things
seen matter and others don't.
Naturally, to construe the performative spontaneity of
aesthetic perception on the analogy of proficiency in one's
native language, as Margolis does, one would have to grant
that perception itself must be a culturally and theoretically
freighted affair.[17] The sensory organs of an art connoisseur,
then, must undergo a kind of transformation similar to the one
that the hands of a pianist undergo with years of practice. One
would have to stipulate, then, that in virtue of their cultural
experience, certain individuals are transformed in a way that
enables them to effortlessly perceive the features of artworks
meaningfully, ensuring that the process of speculative
interpretation always begins with a meaningful substratum
already supplied by the spontaneous operation of a culturally
elaborate perceptual experience. As more theorists begin to
recognize this possibility as a legitimate one,[18] it may only
suffice to add that an account construing recognition of
artworks as a spontaneous process resulting from certain
training or enculturation has, at the very least, the merit of
being a simple one.
This simplicity, however, can only be gained at a price of a
theoretical concession that some may find it difficult to make.
Margolis' claim, of course, doesn't simply amount to saying
that some of us acquire such expertise in placing artworks
within a theoretical context that there's no longer any point in
distinguishing between perception and theoretical explanation
that immediately follows. As Danto correctly points out,
Margolis is talking about a much larger issue: that of the limits
of perception itself.[19] In Margolis' view, it seems, differently
educated people -- people with different cultural histories --

must literally see slightly different things. We may be able to
calibrate our culturally induced differences in a discussion that
follows the encounter with an artwork, yet what really counts
in the enjoyment of art - the spontaneous perception - may be
entirely different for representatives of different cultural
milieus. What follows from this is that there can be no single
privileged account of the definition of artwork or of artistic
value. If spontaneity of aesthetic experience results from a
kind of symbiotic relationship between artworks and human
agents, different and potentially incompatible forms of such
symbiosis would be possible, with each alteration in cultural
context giving rise to a new distinct set of possibilities. What
appears lost in such a picture is the possibility of an objective
criterion for judging what is an artwork and what is not, a
possibility of a "correct" assignment of a truth-value; since, on
Margolis' terms, objectivity is only gained a posteriori, in virtue
of an empirical consensus that may be useful in its own right
but cannot claim any special legitimacy and cannot exhaust the
meaning of a genuine experience of art.
A well-chosen word, a humorous remark, strike immediately
and strike true; they do not allow for separation between form
and content. Intuitively we know this and often refuse to
repeat a clever phrase to someone who missed it the first time
around. One can explain a joke or paraphrase a meaning of a
metaphor, one can give synonymous expressions for a
carefully chosen word, but the effect is destroyed in such a
transition. Understanding what it means to see and appreciate
something is not tantamount to seeing or appreciating it.
Theoretical knowledge, no matter how well rehearsed, only
enables us to understand what somebody else sees. Seeing
itself, however, requires something an eye cannot decry: an
experience of enculturation that molds one's sensibilities on
the level that often bypasses self-conscious intellection. The
pleasure one derives from something following an explicit
theoretical explanation is a vicarious pleasure, because the
real pleasure consists in getting it right without explanations.
The effortlessness that I speak of and the richness of the
understanding that results do not come from knowledge of
theory; they come from experience and practice. One doesn't
speak a language simply by knowing the rules of grammar and
having meaningful equivalents assigned to most of the
vocabulary items. One begins speaking a language precisely at
the moment when one can stop translating. The same is likely
to hold true of artworks.
Someone who looks appreciatively at a painting by Debuffet is
much less like a new-fangled Champillion in front of a Rosetta
stone and is much more like a man who's just met an old
acquaintance on the street. Appreciation of art must be a habit
like any other; it comes from repeated encounters with works
of art, from talking about art, reading about it and thinking
about it in private. Like any habit, it is largely automated. We
can indeed say that a connoisseur transfigures a real thing
into a work of art by applying his or her knowledge of theory
and history, but only if we mean it as a reductive metaphor of
the same ilk as the one we employ when we say that a
baseball player calculates the trajectory of the ball. We see
hammers in paintings because we've seen them sitting in our
father's toolbox; and for the exact same reasons we see Puvis

de Chavannes in a Picasso painting and Vitebsk outside the
window of a painting by Chagall.
The difference between a culturally enriched experience
valorized by Margolis and the theoretically reprocessed
understanding advocated by Danto corresponds roughly to the
difference between the spontaneous enjoyment of a
connoisseur and a labor-intensive performance of a dedicated
student who tries to match the description supplied by a
famous art critic to a perceptual surface that melts into
indifference before the student's myopic gaze. On the surface,
at least, Margolis' account appears more attractive. The
question is how realistic such a scenario would appear on
pragmatic terms. As Lamarque points out in a recent paper, it
is entirely reasonable to think that existence of artworks
depends on the existence of a certain cultural milieu capable
of giving rise to audiences that appreciate them.[20] As
Lamarque explains, objects may possess different properties
when viewed qua different things.[21] It is entirely
conceivable, then, for a block of marble to possess certain
qualities when viewed qua a work of art which it doesn't
possess when viewed qua a paper-press. Thus, if populations
capable of viewing objects qua artworks cease to exist, the
physical objects that we treat qua works of art may endure,
but they will cease to exist qua works of art.[22]
This argument can be pushed a little bit further. If we imagine
the artworld public as a population of cultural agents who are
at liberty to see every artwork now qua an artwork and now
qua a physical object devoid of artistic merit, we may well end
up with a minimally revised version of Danto's stance. While,
as Lamarque points out, even the most devoted art aficionado
must be capable of imagining a possible world in which all
things that s/he considers art would not be such, it is more
difficult to imagine a connoisseur of the arts who can convince
him- or herself, even for a moment, that s/he is living in one
of those possible worlds.
It is not clear that someone who stands before a work that
they consider a masterpiece could really learn to see it as a
mere physical object devoid of any special value. For instance,
I am not sure that one would have an easy time convincing
someone like Danto to cut up Cezanne's Bathers while viewing
it qua a mere physical object. It seems more reasonable to
think that a symbiotic relationship with an artwork, even one
of a merely cultural symbiosis understood as a particular type
of Lebensform, or more precisely as a form of "living together
with," would impose stronger ties on its constituents than
those that would allow for gratuitous switching of perspectives.
Superman and Clark Kent, in Lamarque's example, possess
different properties; yet it is very likely that a child who had
seen Superman will never be able to look at Clark Kent the
same way as before. Conversely, someone who sees a painting
by Rembrandt is not thereby precluded from seeing the
canvas, the paint and the wooden frame; yet this recognition
that a painting is composed of real things doesn't diminish the
admiration one feels for it.
What I'm trying to say, then, is that as long as we preserve in
some form the distinction between artworks and mere real
things, we will always gravitate towards some variant of

Danto's argument concerned with the imputation of theoretical
properties to an indifferent object. Moreover, I'm inclined to
argue that there's no good philosophical reason for preserving
the distinction; yet a number of bona fide philosophical
reasons, such as the ones cited by Margolis, for dropping it.
Artworks are mere real things. The distinction between an
artwork and a mere real thing can only become operative at
the periphery of the artworld where it makes sense to start
distinguishing between inside and outside; which is not to
deny that people whose life is bound up with the fortunes and
larger destinies of art treat artworks in ways that people who
have no special interest in the arts cannot even begin to
understand. Thus there's no reason to think that for somebody
who is involved in the artworld an artwork ceases to be a real
thing; on the contrary, it would make sense to assume that it
should be seen as the ultimate real thing, of more immediate
interest, more comforting and more familiar than a pit bull, a
cell-phone or a sports car.
Where a layman sees a piece of metal, a car-mechanic may
see a well-designed part, and s/he may treat it with the
special attention and interest it deserves in his or her eyes
even if s/he has no immediate practical use for it. For the
mechanic, this thing exemplifies what it means to be a real
thing. There's no reason why a specialist in arts should think
any differently about artworks. A meaningful difference
between an artwork and a mere real thing emerges only when
we are confronted with a cultural specimen who for the life of
it cannot see a difference between what we regard as a work
of art and what s/he regards as piece of sanitary equipment.
But that scenario may be better served by a straightforward
distinction between a work of art and a commodity rather than
the theoretically freighted distinction between mere real things
and artworks that somehow transcend them.
There was a time in history when artworks were commissioned
by wealthy patrons and executed according to their wishes. On
the one hand this arrangement restricted the artist's freedom;
on the other it ensured that the artist operated outside the
regular market conditions - the work was produced on
demand. The modern artist finds him- or herself in an
altogether different position: free to paint what s/he pleases,
but then obliged to peddle his or her wares in the manner of a
lowly craftsman. Thus, the modern capitalistic society, as
Greenberg recognized in his famous essay, on the one hand
creates the conditions for autonomous development of art, of
art for art's sake, and on the other threatens to subject artistic
practice to the demands of uncultivated taste of the average
moneyed bourgeois. Art, then, ends up facing a difficult task
of attempting to serve no interests but its own without
simultaneously severing the "umbilical cord of gold" which it
requires for prosaic sustenance.[23]
The solution to this problem is offered by the modern economy
of value itself, in which the most lucrative value a thing can
possess is speculative value, a value projected onto its surface
by various political and commercial institutions employing,
respectively, propaganda or advertising. In such an economy,
the mere physicality of a thing can only be of interest in the
calculation of the shipping costs. Whether the actual
commerce is conducted in symbols of prestigious consumption

or in regalia of redemptive political struggle, the value of a
thing ultimately derives from the place it occupies within the
narrative that generates a particular hierarchy of values, that
is, a theory of value, setting the dimensions of a given
exchange sphere. By inscribing itself within the terms of either
political or consumer-oriented exchange sphere, an artwork
gains circulation value but compromises its identity qua an
artwork, thus degenerating into kitsch. In order to retain its
cultural autonomy, then, an artwork needs to exist within its
own sphere of circulation, a sphere that could only be
constituted by a value-theory derived from the history of art
itself.
The role of the art critic, then, is to shield the autonomous
and self-centered life of the arts from the subjective
judgments and whims of those who provide artists with the
necessary financial support through an appeal to an historical,
intra-theoretical standard of value. The critic succeeds in this
task by serving as a liaison between the artworld and its
patrons, as a guarantor of the objective value of art before the
paying public which is thereby disenfranchised from deciding
whether something is, in fact, a work of art (worth paying for).
Greenberg's genius consisted in realizing just how easily such
a setup could be brought about. In other words, Greenberg
realized that people would much rather own art, sponsor art
and know about art than actually look at artworks. An
encounter with an actual artwork may be, in fact, undesirable;
it may engender doubts about its value, lack of comprehension
and even aversion. It is best, then, to assure the public that
the value of the work of art on which it spends money and
time does not depend on such uncertain factors as a personal
reaction to displayed properties, but is secured in an objective
and impersonal fashion by the place the artwork occupies
within the theoretical space of reasons.
An art critic qua a master of theory, then, becomes a kind of
glorified investment advisor who assures the buyer of the
enduring value of the piece s/he is buying; a public funding
board of the enduring cultural value of the show for which the
grants are allocated; the reading public of the immense
significance of the show they're attending; and a cultural
parvenu of the wisdom of his or her borrowed opinions. On the
revised terms of the game, one can become quite proficient at
discoursing on the subject of art without seeing a single
artwork and without possessing any kind of special sensibility
or talent. If we trust Shusterman, one can even do philosophy
of art construed purely as a kind of metacriticism.[24] All the
while, the actual artists can continue their work without paying
much heed to the changing whims of the public, under the
rhetorical foil supplied by aesthetic theory.
This account, of course, is somewhat of a caricature; however,
it succeeds in suggesting a striking similarity between
Greenberg's artwork/commodity distinction and Danto's
distinction between artwork and mere real thing. Greenberg's
distinction, of course, relies on an implicit value judgment;
and Danto's, I think, cannot fail to do so as well. The point I
am trying to make is that insofar as the distinction between
artwork and mere real thing implies a value judgment,
supposedly mediated by the objective criteria supplied by
aesthetic theory, the distinction cannot be defended on purely

philosophical grounds without invoking some sort of cognitive
privilege. Any attempt to elevate such a distinction to the
status of a philosophically justified strategy will necessarily
founder in virtue of considerations cited by critics like Margolis
and briefly rehearsed in this essay. Hence it may be best to
abandon the distinction altogether; in the process,
sidestepping the danger of convincing ourselves that the
primary function of art is to advance aesthetic theory rather
than to provide meaningful experiences of enjoyment and
appreciation.
3. Conclusion
For quite a number of years Margolis had argued that Danto's
distinction between artworks and mere real things generates
insoluble paradoxes related to phenomenology of aesthetic
perception and ontology of artworks. Yet the distinction has
continued to resurface on a regular basis in philosophical
literature. To this day, it seems to be implied in the
background of many discussions that make no explicit
reference to Danto's work, such as those that assume a
principled theoretical distinction between artistic and nonartistic uses of modern technology, etc. Danto's own reply to
Margolis has been that his theory is not concerned with the
phenomenology of perception but only with the analysis of
truth conditions obtained in cultural language. In this essay, I
argued that the distinction cannot be defended even on these
grounds without assigning an unwarranted discursive privilege
to certain critical and art-historical practices.
I would further like to suggest that instead of thinking that our
discussions of art are ultimately grounded in the terms of one
or another normative rational framework, we should view
them as historically conditioned productions of certain
discursive practices that arise in response to diverse social and
cultural demands of their time, providing their participants
with opportunities for productive and meaningful exchanges.
At the time when Danto first introduced the distinction
between artworks and mere real things, this distinction
enabled theorists of art to engage certain artworks, most
notably the works of pop-art, in new and largely unexpected
ways. Artists in the first half of the twentieth century showed a
sustained interest in addressing theoretical problems related to
the exercise of their craft. Pop-art, on the other hand, can be
seen as redirecting attention from the questions of theory to
the appreciation of the everyday, mundane mere things of
contemporary culture. Danto's ingenious theoretical maneuver
enabled philosophers to eliminate this apparent discontinuity
and consequently to see the work of Warhol as a logical
culmination of the artistic tradition rather than a radical break
with it. That in and of itself was a very interesting move.
However, it had the unfortunate upshot of convincing a
number of people in the philosophical profession that since
artworks are essentially about theory, one should be justified
in discussing theory without discussing art because in the end
it is theory that makes an artwork out of the mere real thing.
It is only natural, of course, that participants in any
meaningful cultural discourse should pay closer attention to
the founding texts or artifacts that belong to their own field of
play; that artists would be more interested in artworks while

philosophers may be more interested in scholarly papers on
the subject of art. The problem is, rather, one of emphasis.
Thus, we can either view the landmark works in our own field
of inquiry (philosophy) as opening up new possibilities for
constructive dialogue with the work done in other fields (art)
or we can interpret them as endowing us with a license to
insist that this dialogue should be conducted exclusively on our
own terms which are understood to be dialectically superior.
My intuition is that whenever we opt for this second
alternative, whether we construe it as a final dialectical
Aufhebung or as an analytic reduction, we sooner or later end
up generating complex and rather technical puzzles, the
resolution of which oftentimes remains a matter of utmost
indifference to anyone outside our own narrowly focused
profession. Danto's theory, in my view, started off as an
interesting way to engage artists in a new kind of dialogue, as
well as a way of radically altering the terms of the thencurrent philosophical discussions. Further down the road, it
ended up being a locus of specialized philosophical quarrels.
My intention, accordingly, was to review the current state of
the argument, as I see it, so as to suggest that we are now in
a position to move past it.
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